The decision
The Delhi High Court has reiterated that a doctor’s certificate of fitness and the maker’s thumb impression are safeguards of prudence in recording a dying declaration; neither is an inflexible statutory condition for its admissibility or validity. The Court applied this principle while examining a declaration recorded by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate from a woman who had suffered 100 per cent burns and whose hands had sustained degloving injuries.
Background and prosecution case
The deceased married Tilak Raj on 9 May 1997. On 21 October 1998, she was admitted to Lok Nayak Jai Prakash (LNJP) Hospital with 100 per cent burn injuries. She died two days later, on 23 October 1998.
On 22 October 1998, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate recorded her statement in a question-and-answer format. As summarised in the published report, she stated that her husband had demanded a Maruti car, that she had brought Rs. 50,000 on two occasions, and that kerosene had been poured on her before she was set on fire in the presence of her in-laws. The statement was recorded as dying declaration PW 4/A.
The prosecution registered an FIR at Kalyan Puri Police Station. The Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts, by judgment dated 11 July 2002, convicted Tilak Raj, his father Prem Singh and his mother Anokhi Devi under Sections 302, 201 and 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. His sister Raj Kumari was convicted under Section 498A. Prem Singh died during the pendency of the appeals, and the proceedings abated against him.
Challenge to the dying declaration
The defence questioned whether a woman with 100 per cent burns could have made a coherent statement. It also relied on the absence of a meaningful thumb impression as a reason to doubt the declaration.
The record showed that the deceased’s hands had suffered degloving injuries, a condition in which the skin is separated or stripped away. The thumb impression appearing on the document was almost blank and did not disclose discernible ridges or curves.
The High Court considered the medical evidence, including the evidence of the burns specialist examined by the Court. The medical material explained that a patient may initially be disoriented because of shock and may become fit to give a statement after resuscitation.
This was relevant to the difference between the patient being declared unfit on 21 October and fit on 22 October 1998. The Court applied the principle that the percentage of burns, by itself, does not determine whether a person was capable of making a reliable statement.
Medical certification and thumb impression: Rule of caution
The Bench referred to the Supreme Court decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh, Laxman v. State of Maharashtra and Govindappa v. State of Karnataka.
The governing approach is to assess whether the person making the declaration was mentally fit and capable of giving the statement. A medical certificate is an important safeguard, but the absence of a particular form of certification does not automatically invalidate a dying declaration if the evidence otherwise establishes the maker’s fitness.
In the present case, the declaration had been recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and was supported by a medical endorsement. The Court therefore held that the precaution required in the circumstances had been observed.
It also examined the original physical record rather than treating the absence of identifiable ridges as conclusive proof that no thumb impression had been taken.
The Court observed that an SDM recording a dying declaration cannot be expected to possess the specialised medical knowledge of a skin or burn specialist. There was no material to show that the SDM had been informed that degloving would make the victim’s thumb impression ineffective.
The Court considered that the impression had been taken as a precaution, but that the injury to the skin explained why the resulting mark was almost blank.
Assessment of the declaration and surrounding evidence
The Court also considered whether the statement appeared to have been tutored. It noted that the deceased’s account did not implicate Raj Kumari in the incident because she was not present that day. The Bench treated this feature as a circumstance supporting the genuineness of the declaration.
The judgment report further records that the Court considered discrepancies in the witnesses’ recollection of timings in the context of the passage of time, rejected the alibi advanced by the defence, and treated the evidence that the scene had been cleaned while retaining the smell of kerosene as relevant to the charge under Section 201 IPC.
The brother’s account was treated as hearsay. These aspects were assessed alongside the dying declaration and the other evidence on record.
Findings on the individual accused and final outcome
The High Court upheld the murder conviction of Tilak Raj and his mother, Anokhi Devi. However, it found that the evidence did not establish a specific case of cruelty against Anokhi Devi for the purpose of Section 498A IPC and acquitted her of that charge.
Having regard to her age of 77 years, the Court reduced her sentence to the period already undergone, reported as five years, seven months and one day.
The Court set aside Raj Kumari’s conviction under Section 498A IPC, holding that criminal liability could not be founded on conjecture in the absence of adequate evidence against her.
Prem Singh’s appeal had abated following his death. Tilak Raj was directed to surrender within three working days.
The Court also called upon the Commissioner of Police to take steps to arrest the proclaimed offenders, Sudesh and Hans Raj, and to submit monthly progress reports.
Relevant statutory provision
A dying declaration is relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, when it concerns the cause of the maker’s death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in that death, in cases where the cause of death is in question.
The provision does not prescribe that the declaration must invariably be recorded by a Magistrate, bear a doctor's certificate, or carry the maker’s thumb impression.
The central question remains whether the declaration is voluntary, truthful and made in a fit state of mind. The evidentiary safeguards must be evaluated in the facts and circumstances of each case.
Relevant extract from the judgment
The following passage is reproduced as quoted in the published report of the decision. The original judgment PDF was unavailable for independent examination; consequently, the exact wording and paragraph number could not be independently verified against the judgment:
“...neither a doctor’s certificate nor a thumb impression is a legal requirement for a valid dying declaration, but rather a rule of caution. In the present case, the dying declaration PW 4/A was recorded by the SDM duly supported by a medical endorsement, thereby satisfying the rule of caution”.
— Delhi High Court, Raj Kumari v. State NCT of Delhi, 2026:DHC:9629-DB.
The passage highlights the distinction between a mandatory legal requirement and a precautionary safeguard. The absence of a doctor's certificate or thumb impression cannot, by itself, invalidate a dying declaration. The Court must instead examine the circumstances in which the statement was recorded, the mental fitness of the declarant and the overall reliability of the evidence.
Significance of the decision
The decision reiterates that the evidentiary value of a dying declaration must be determined by its reliability rather than by mechanically insisting on formalities that are not prescribed as mandatory legal requirements.
Medical endorsement and identification safeguards remain important. However, their absence or physical impossibility must be assessed in the context of the particular case.
In cases involving extensive burn injuries, the percentage of burns and the physical condition of the declarant's hands may be relevant circumstances. Nevertheless, neither should replace a careful assessment of the declarant's mental fitness and the overall credibility of the statement.
